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Abstract: 
 
Vitalism claims that biological organisms are governed by nonmaterial agents like entelechies. 
The received view today rejects vitalism by presupposing metaphysical materialism (or 
physicalism). Metaphysical materialism maintains that the world is ultimately material (or 
physical), and it, therefore, repudiates the existence of nonmaterial entelechies. However, 
this marks a shift compared with the arguments against vitalism developed by logical 
empiricists, who were indifferent to metaphysical issues and were only concerned with 
logical and empirical matters in the sciences. Logical empiricists rejected the concept of the 
entelechy (vitalism), because vital laws confirmed by biological phenomena were unavailable; 
in contrast, they accepted the concept of the atom (materialism), since it constituted physical 
laws and was therefore associated with verifiable results in modern physics. 
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Introduction: The Metaphysical Refutation of Vitalism 
 
Today most biologists and philosophers understand vitalism as a heretical doctrine in the 
history of biology, originally proposed by Hans Driesch in the early twentieth century. 2 
According to Driesch’s doctrine of vitalism, biological organisms are governed by 
nonmaterial vital agents termed entelechies (Driesch 1929; Churchill 1969; Allen 2008). Now 
the received view consents to an almost universal rejection of vitalism. For current biologists 
and philosophers, vitalism is no longer a viable option because it violates their materialist 
belief. For instance, to defend organicism Scott Gilbert and Sahotra Sarkar first characterize 
materialism as the default ontological option for the philosophy of biology. Then for these 
two authors, vitalism is heretical because it advances a “non-materialist claim” confirming 
 
1 Bohang Chen [Orcid: 0000-0001-7507-4854] is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Philosophy and 
Moral Sciences at Ghent University. Address: Blandijnberg 2, 9000 Ghent – Belgium. Email: 
Bohang.Chen@Ugent.be 
2 But this by no means suggests that Driesch’s doctrine was the only doctrine of vitalism in the history 
of biology. Since the late eighteenth century, a great many doctrines have been labelled as doctrines 
of vitalism (Hein 1968; Benton 1974; Normandin and Wolfe (eds.) 2013; Wolfe 2011, 2014, 2017). 




the existence of some specific “life force,” thereby going against the “ontologically 
materialistic philosophy”, which “provides the basis for contemporary natural Science” 
(Gilbert and Sarkar 2000, 1). 
Next Gilbert and Sarkar term their own organicist position material holism, which 
consents to metaphysical materialism, or in their own words, “ontological materialism.” 
Today the two terms, “metaphysics” and “ontology,” are often used interchangeably, and in 
those cases, both are concerned with the basic, fundamental, ultimate or essential categories 
of the metaphysical Reality.3 For Gilbert and Sarkar, the default materialist position endorses 
a belief in the constitutional priority of microphysical entities over biological objects. As a 
matter of fact, most biologists and philosophers, following Gilbert and Sarkar, take it for 
granted that from a metaphysical point of view a biological object is nothing but, and 
therefore ontologically reducible to, a set of fundamental physical entities and their 
interactions. For instance, the evolutionary biologist Ernest Mayr claims that modern 
biologists do not oppose “constitutive reduction”, which suggests that “all organic 
processes can ultimately be reduced to or explained by physico-chemical processes” (Mayr 
1988, 10-11). This position is termed “ontological reduction” by Ingo Brigandt and Alan Love 
(2017), in the entry “Reductionism in biology” from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
For them, ontological reductionism claims that “each particular biological system (e.g. an 
organism) is constituted by nothing but molecules and their interactions” (2). Moreover, they 
affirm that ontological reductionism is “a default stance nowadays among philosophers and 
biologists…” (3) 
Yet to be more accurate, currently, a similar but more popular stance among 
philosophers is physicalism (Stoljar 2010, 2015). Various formulations of physicalism exist in 
either a priori or a posteriori forms (Banks 2014). But for most philosophers of biology, 
physicalism is still a metaphysical position incompatible with vitalism. For instance, according 
to Alex Rosenberg, physicalism suggests that “there are no nonphysical events, states, or 
processes, and so biological events, states, and processes are ‘nothing but’ physical ones” 
(2006, 25). Peter Godfrey-Smith makes the physicalism-vitalism dichotomy more explicit. In 
his Philosophy of Biology textbook, Godfrey-Smith claims that vitalism is at odds with the 
physicalist interpretation of life (Godfrey-Smith 2014, 10). More recently Brigandt and Love 
also ascertain us that vitalism has been denied by physicalism (Brigandt and Love 2017, 3). 
Ontological materialism, constitutive or ontological reductionism, physicalism and 
various other metaphysical positions, although their contents differ in detail, all tend to 
impose a priori restraints onto the ultimate constituents of the metaphysical Reality. In 
consequence, most of them appear to legitimize a metaphysical rejection of vitalism. The 
controversy over materialism (or physicalism) and vitalism seems closed today, attested by 
Brigandt and Love, who write that “vitalism (...) is largely of historical interest” (Brigandt and 
Love 2017, 3). In the history of science, indeed, one significant moment for vitalism was the 
early twentieth century, when logical empiricists attacked the vitalism of Hans Driesch and 
contributed to its final overthrow. Along with some biologists, logical empiricists argued that 
the concept of the entelechy had no place in scientific biology. 
Yet logical empiricists were also famous for their rejection of metaphysics, so it seems 
unlikely that logical empiricists refuted Driesch’s vitalism out of metaphysical concerns. 
Indeed, a closer examination shows that the logical empiricist criticisms of vitalism were at 
odds with the received view held by current biologists and philosophers. In this article, my 
aim is to give an interpretation of the criticisms of vitalism offered by logical empiricists. First, 
 
3  This is not to deny that these two terms are also used in different senses. For instance, some 
philosophers, under the name of “ontology,” deal with questions about categories developed in 
empirical sciences (e.g., Wimsatt 1994). These questions have more scientific relevance and are 
irrelevant to metaphysical concerns over “the basic, fundamental, ultimate or essential categories”. 
See Hook (1953) for a fine distinction.  




I show that materialism formulated in metaphysical terms was not within the concern of 
logical empiricists in dealing with vitalism, and logical empiricists dismissed metaphysical 
materialism as raising meaningless pseudo-questions about a questionable metaphysical 
Reality. Second, from the logical empiricist point of view, even though vitalism advanced 
nonmaterial agents like entelechies, it could not be refuted simply for its going against 
metaphysical materialism. Instead, logical empiricists rejected vitalism for its lack of precise 
law formulations and its inability to generate determinate experimental results. In order to 
better articulate the logical empiricist standpoint, I give an analytic comparison between a 
representative materialistic concept, that is, the atom, and the vitalistic concept of the 
entelechy, on the basis of some writings from logical empiricists. In the end, I clarify the 
doctrine of physicalism developed by logical empiricists. I claim that the physicalism of logical 
empiricists was hypothetical and empirical in character. Unlike the physicalism understood in 
the philosophy of biology today, the physicalism of logical empiricists was no metaphysical 
position, and it could not enforce a refutation of vitalism. 
 
Logical Empiricism against Metaphysical Materialism 
 
The received view today issues a metaphysical rejection of vitalism. Now vitalism is no longer 
a viable option, since biologists and philosophers conceive of several materialist 
metaphysical positions, from ontological reductionism to a priori physicalism, as already 
having captured the ultimate constituents of the metaphysical Reality. This evaluation of 
vitalism, however, goes sharply against the non-metaphysical ethos of logical empiricism. My 
focus in this section is then to characterize the logical empiricist attitude towards 
metaphysics, especially metaphysical versions of materialism.  
It is well known that logical empiricists were hostile to every form of metaphysics. Thus, 
there is no doubt that logical empiricists would reject vitalism if it made statements about 
the so-called Essences of the biological reality. However, very importantly, the anti-
metaphysical attitude of logical empiricists will be misunderstood, if we neglect their equally 
forceful opposition to metaphysical doctrines of materialism. Commenting on the philosophy 
of science in the early twentieth century, Rosenberg sees this point clearly: 
 
In the heyday of empiricism, mechanism or materialism was treated as a metaphysical 
doctrine no less otiose than vitalism and organicism. No empiricist who embraced the 
thesis of the unity of science took the claim as one about the metaphysical assimilation 
of biological to the physical, for this thesis was treated as just as empty of empirical 
content as its vitalistic denial. (Rosenberg 1985, 22) 
 
Rudolf Carnap, perhaps the most well-known logical empiricist in mainstream analytic 
philosophy, later in his intellectual autobiography suggested that throughout his career he 
was indifferent to metaphysical materialism. In Carnap’s own words, “the ontological theses 
of the traditional doctrines of (…) materialism remained for me entirely out of consideration” 
(Carnap 1963, 18), and in fact he treated “the theses of phenomenalism, materialism, realism 
and so son in their traditional forms as pseudo theses” (Carnap 1963, 50). For Carnap, 
materialism was chiefly of two variants in the nineteenth century, the dialectic materialism 
held by Marxist philosophers and the mechanism which assumed that phenomena and laws 
in nature are reducible to those in mechanics. Of the former, Carnap commented that “the 
dialectic in its Marxist form” should be rejected “no less than the Hegelian dialectic” (Carnap 
1963, 24).4 
 
4 The logical empiricist reading of German idealist philosophers might not be entirely fair. Even though 
it was not inadequate to brand philosophers like Hegel and Schelling as metaphysicians, logical 
empiricists failed to note that both Hegel and Schelling were quite learned men and built their 




 Other logical empiricists paid greater attention to the doctrine of mechanism. For 
instance, Herbert Feigl, a central participant in the logical empiricist movement, expressed 
his discontent with this misconception commonly held by humanists against science: 
“science is still identified with an absurd mechanistic reductionism” (Feigl 1953, 8). Frank, 
another major logical empiricist, traced one important historical background for the rise of 
logical empiricism as “the failure of mechanistic science” (Frank 1949b, 4). For Frank, “two 
characteristic beliefs of nineteenth-century science broke down during its last decades; these 
were the belief that all phenomena in nature can be reduced to the laws of mechanics (...)” 
(Frank 1949b, 4) Frank repeated this story throughout his life (Frank 1949a, 1987). Further, in 
his interpretation of the great physicist Ernst Mach, Frank endorsed Mach’s attitude against 
metaphysical materialism of the mechanistic form. According to Frank, Mach essentially 
“separated the conception of scientific explanation from mechanical explanation” and 
through this separation he “saved the scientific world picture from going down along with 
the mechanistic picture” (Frank 1949b, 6). In Mach’s mind, mechanistic reductionism was a 
“pure illusion”, because mechanical phenomena “chosen as the basis of explanation are by 
themselves no more understandable than the phenomena that are to be explained” (Frank 
1949b, 6). 
The American logical empiricist Ernest Nagel offered another case against materialist 
metaphysics, in a debate with the physicist Arthur Eddington. In his 1929 the Nature of the 
Physical World, Eddington contributed a philosophical reflection on modern physics and 
provided his famous (or infamous) tale of two tables. For Eddington, there was “an ordinary 
table” as “a commonplace object” in everyday human experience, and there was also “a 
scientific table” which was “mostly emptiness” but with “numerous electric charges rushing 
about with great speed” (Eddington 1929, x). Further, according to Edington, modern physics 
assured that the “scientific table is the only one which is really there” and the ordinary table 
was merely a “strange compound of external nature, mental imagery and inherited 
prejudice.” (Eddington 1929, xii) In Eddington’s viewpoint, modern physics identified the 
metaphysical Reality as consisting of small physical particles and “mostly emptiness”, as a 
result, science could dismiss commonsense experience as a sheer illusion. However, Nagel 
sneered at Eddington’s formulation and treated it as a typical misreading of modern physics, 
for its misuse of concepts and categories from the different context of commonsense 
experience. For Nagel, the concepts used by Eddington, such as “mostly emptiness” were 
“defined or specified in just those contexts in which it is appropriate to predicate” the 
ordinary table, and they had “no assigned meanings” in modern physics and were thus 
meaningless when used to characterize the so-called scientific table (Nagel 1941, 313). Above 
all, Eddington’s metaphysical tale of two tables annihilated the reality of commonsense 
experience, and, according to Nagel, would not be taken seriously in the logical empiricist 
conception of knowledge (1940, 438). For logical empiricists, in the words of Frank, “matter 
and atom” were merely auxiliary concepts of natural sciences (or even only modern physics), 
the metaphysical move to read them into “everything in the world” was a grave mistake to 
be avoided in an adequate philosophy of science (Frank 1949b, 74). 
 
The Logical Empiricist Conception of the Atom 
 
A current example in modern physics, already mentioned above by Frank and Nagel, will help 
better illuminate the logical empiricist attitude toward materialism. Though philosophers 
today seem to have disagreements on the most adequate formulation of materialism and 
physicalism (Stoljar 2015; Ellenzweig and Zammito (eds.) 2017), the dominant version shared 
by scientists is still atomism. In current science education offered to laymen and science 
 
philosophical systems upon contemporary scientific knowledge. For this, see Friedman (2010). 




students, atomism is generally conveyed as a body of indisputable truths about the basic 
constituents of the metaphysical Reality. In this way, the scientific concept of the atom, 
consolidated in the nineteenth century through the great achievements in statistical 
mechanics and atomic physics, receives an interpretation intuitively intelligible to 
commonsense experience. According to most scientists, even though at the super atomic 
levels nature has many different layers, from the ontological point of view entities at these 
layers are nothing but numerous atoms in certain spatial configurations. For biologists, in 
particular, biological organisms are mere aggregates of invisibly small atoms of different 
chemical elements. 
Now regarding vitalism, the exclusive right to serve as the basic units of the Reality, 
claimed by the atoms, rules out possibility of the existence of vital agents peculiar to biology. 
This metaphysical opposition between atomism and vitalism is vividly demonstrated by the 
philosopher of biology David Hull, “both scientists and philosophers take ontological 
reductionism for granted. Vitalism is dead. Organisms are ‘nothing but’ atoms, and that is 
that” (Hull 1981, 282). Seen from the case of Hull, I suggest, the atomistic version of 
metaphysical materialism is implicitly presupposed in general science education. Sometimes 
even branded as the scientific worldview, metaphysical materialism asserts that all objects at 
the super atomic levels are “composed” of invisibly small atoms.5 
It is certainly comfortable to treat an atom as an invisibly small entity, and further a 
biological object as composed of large amounts of atoms. This well accommodates 
commonsense experience wherein a string of beads is composed of visibly small beads. 
However, nothing was more alien to logical empiricists than digesting atomism through 
analogies in commonsense experience. Moritz Schlick depicted the everyday version of 
atomism as stemming from the pictorial worldview of the microcosm. Under the pictorial 
worldview, the microcosm was invisible because entities within it were spatially too small. 
But for Schlick, “…a pictorial model of electrical and magnetic processes…[has] long since 
been finally abandoned”, and “the inadequacy [of the pictorial model of the atom] is even 
more clearly brought home to us by the modern quantum theory which shows that even in 
respect of spatio-temporal conditions, the model must fail” (Schlick 1949, 16). 
The pictorial worldview was implicitly associated with the belief that the Complex (e.g., 
macro objects) must be constituted out of the Simples (e.g. atoms). But for Nagel, this belief 
is “either a tautology or a sheer dogma; and the dogma appears to me to have been 
generated by viewing as ‘ultimate constituents’ of a subject-matter phases of it which have 
isolated through the use of a particular method relevant in a particular context of inquiry” 
(Nagel 1936, 15). So according to Nagel, the concept of the atom must be understood in 
modern physics and its associated mode of inquiry. It became questionable or even 
meaningless when taken out of its proper context. 
To better illustrate the logical empiricist conception of the atom, it is useful to go back 
to their intellectual predecessor, Mach. Mach was famous (or infamous) for his distrust of 
atomism. For Mach, the atom was no more than a “constructed mental symbol” to represent 
“a complex of sensuous elements” (Mach 1897, 152). In other words, the atom “must remain 
a tool for representing phenomena” (Mach 1898, 207), and it “would be a mere empty word 
for one in whom it did not awaken a large group of well-ordered sense-impressions” (Mach 
 
5 Some very helpful comments on previous drafts of this article have pointed out that scientists in their 
everyday practice may not care about these metaphysical claims of materialism and atomism, and 
even if they do, they give a false interpretation of their sciences. I agree with these comments, but 
they do not contradict the fact that most scientists hold the belief that atoms exclusively constitute 
the metaphysical Reality. My point is rather that although this belief is irrelevant to scientific practice 
and is even very unsound upon a critical analysis (which will be done in a future article from the 
standpoint of transcendental philosophy, starting from the Kantian category of community or wholes-
parts relation), it does underpin many bold formulations of materialism and physicalism. 




1898, 202-3). To those who were inclined to take atoms as the ultimate blocks of the 
metaphysical Reality, Mach raised a question from psychology, “(…) how is it possible to 
explain feeling by the motions of the atoms of the brain?” (Mach 1898, 208). 
Mach appeared to hold an instrumentalist view of atomism (but this is dubious, see 
Brush 1968; Banks 2014), and based on Mach’s doctrine Frank made essential improvements. 
Yet to start, Frank understood Mach’s concern, and he agreed with Mach that the concept 
of the atom was useless in psychology and cognitive science (Frank 1949b, 70). But Frank 
quickly moved beyond Mach by insisting that “the usefulness of the atomic theories in this 
limited realm (physics) is certainly indisputable” (Frank 1949b, 70). According to Frank, Mach 
underestimated the role of mathematics in consolidating the concept of the atom. As Frank 
pointed out, the atom concept was valid in modern physics since it participated in “a 
structural system having exact logical coherence with the world of facts” (Frank 1949b, 44). 
But like Mach, Frank did not give a metaphysical reading of atomism. For Frank, the validity 
of the atom concept partly lied in its “form” which involved a set of mathematical equations, 
and this was quite unlike the claim from materialist metaphysics, in which the atom stands as 
crude “matter” in the metaphysical Reality. 
More importantly, according to logical empiricists, the atom concept could only be 
understood within scientific development. Following Frank, Nagel gave this point a subtler 
illustration from the historical perspective (for a history of atomism, see Chalmers 2009). For 
Nagel, the “forms” associated with the atom concept accumulated after Dalton revived the 
atomic theory of matter in chemistry. However, this accumulation of knowledge could not 
be used to support the view that physicists were making progress “in our knowledge 
concerning a fixed set of submicroscopic objects” (Nagel 1979a, 370). Quite similar to 
Thomas Kuhn (Kuhn 1962), Nagel suggested that this was because: 
 
Each [atomic] theory in a certain series of theoretical constructions having a number 
of broad assumptions in common-postulated (or “defined”) distinctive kinds of 
submicroscopic components for macroscopic objects, with distinctive “natures” for 
the components in each case. (Nagel 1979a, 370)6 
 
Accordingly, Nagel concluded that the atoms of Democritus, the atoms of Dalton, and the 
atoms of modern physics were quite different physical particles, and it was illegitimate to 
regard these theories as unfolding the truths about a metaphysical Reality of atoms. 
Logical empiricists were generally more concerned with contemporary scientific 
theories. Then when it came to the early twentieth century, for them the atom was certainly 
no longer Democritus’ invisible entity, the theory of which was rather speculative; nor was it 
Dalton’s chemical unit, which only had limited use in chemistry. According to Schlick, the 
atom in modern physics could be the elastic spherical entity employed in the kinetic theory 
of gases (Schlick 1949, 98), the point center in the dynamic theory of matter (Schlick 1949, 
102), and the electro-dynamic system in the electrical theory (Schlick 1949, 113-9).7 In each 
 
6 Nagel’s remark clearly reminds us of Kuhn’s idea of incommensurability. Friedman articulates this 
idea in terms of the relativized Kantian conception of constitutive a priori (Friedman 2010, 712). So, 
concerning the history of atomic theory, we might suggest that different conceptions of the atom are 
incommensurable with each other because each constitutes its own a priori laws about the physical 
structures of matter. 
7 Because of these statements, the majority of logical empiricists such as Schlick, Carnap and Frank, 
along with Mach, have long been treated as instrumentalists (Chakravartty 2015), in contrast to a 
minority of realists including Feigl (1936, 1950) and Hans Reichenbach (1938). But recent discussions 
on this point suggests that the traditional interpretation is problematic and misses the real force of 
logical empiricism (Parrini 1994; Salmon 1994; Psillos 2011; Friedman 2011, 2012; Neuber 2014). I endorse 
the view that logical empiricists took the realist-instrumentalist controversy to be, at best a problem 
of “modes of speech” (Nagel 1979a, 152), at worst a metaphysical “pseudo-problem” (Feigl 1979, 




theory, the atom concept was associated with respective physical laws affirmed by 
experimental phenomena.  
The essential difference between the logical empiricist conception of the atom and 
that of metaphysical materialism might be better shown in Frank’s radical interpretation of 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics. According to metaphysical 
materialists, atoms stand out there as basic blocks of matter, each with its own exact position 
and velocity. Then on the basis of the uncertainty principle, materialists suggest that we are 
unable to decide simultaneously on the position and the velocity of an atom. But in sharp 
contrast, Frank suggested that “concepts like position and velocity of a particle can be used 
only under certain experimental conditions, while the formulas of physics only give directions 
for bringing such observations into relation with one another” (Frank 1949b, 178). For Frank, 
quantum mechanics did not postulate any “new mysterious objects like ‘particles without a 
definite position’” (Frank 1949b, 179): 
 
Quantum physics says only that with certain experimental arrangements concepts like 
“particles with a definite position” or “particles with a definite velocity” can be defined. 
In other words, the physical processes that occur with these experimental 
arrangements can be predicted through statements in which one refers to “a particle 
with a definite position” or “a particle with a definite velocity,” but there is no 
arrangement for which one can predict processes through statements involving “a 
particle with a definite position and velocity.” This, however, does not mean that there 
are particles of which, because of the defectiveness of our apparatus or because of 
malicious natural laws, we cannot measure all the characteristics (position and 
velocity); it means rather that such combinations of words as “a particle with 
coordinates x, y, z, and velocity components vx, vy, vz” must not be introduced into the 
language of physics. If we were to say that the things corresponding to such 
combinations of words nevertheless exist as absolute, but unknowable, things, we 
should be going over into pure metaphysics and destroying every bond with 
experience (…). (Frank 1949b, 182) 
 
According to Frank, in quantum mechanics an atom could not be reified into an extended but 
invisible entity standing out there, waiting for any complete description. Instead, its empirical 
existence rested on the validity of physical laws and observational results in a certain 
experimental context.8  
The last sentence captures the essence of the logical empiricist criterion of a valid 
scientific concept. For logical empiricists, on the one hand, the concept invoked law 
formulations; on the other hand, verifiable experimental results should be derivable from the 
laws and theories in which the concept participated. The atom was associated with both and 
therefore it was beyond any doubt a warranted concept in modern physics. 
I have made the effort to articulate the logical empiricist conception of the atom. 
Indeed, the way in which logical empiricists treated the concept of the atom already implied 
their attitude toward vitalism. Again in the words of Rosenberg who has seen this issue 
clearly: “The justification for eliminating or embracing such notions as Driesch’s entelechy is 
 
xxviii). Take atomism as an example. For logical empiricists, the atom was empirically (rather than 
metaphysically) as real as the table, but the table was as instrumental as the atom. Moreover, to 
understand atomism in modern physics, according to logical empiricists, the genuine task was to 
clarify the logical structure of statements about atomism, rather than to contend whether atoms were 
real or not (Friedman 2006). 
8  But admittedly Frank’s radical suggestion about the uncertainty principle was not universally 
accepted among logical empiricists. For instance, Carnap remarked that “such a radical change is 
inadvisable” (Carnap 1966, 289). Yet this disagreement on the specific point in quantum mechanics did 
not affect their universal agreement on the nature of the atom in modern physics. 




no different in kind (than) that employed to assess claims about the existence of electrons, 
magnets, or virions” (Rosenberg 1985, 8). Suppose that a logical empiricist in the early 
twentieth century were invited to assess the validity of the two concepts, the atom in physics 
and the entelechy in biology. Then if he started from commonsense experience, the invisible 
atom and the imperceptible entelechy were equally unavailable to direct observations. One 
could therefore not claim based on sense experience, either that a physical object was 
composed of invisible atoms, or that a biological organism was under the control of an 
entelechy. Yet at that time both concepts were integrated into, or at least appeared in 
contemporary scientific theories, which made statements far beyond commonsense 
experience. Then in order to give an adequate assessment of the atom and the entelechy, 
the logical empiricist must examine their respective roles in scientific theories. As is shown 
above, the atom concept proved sound since it could be associated with physical laws and 
some experimental results in modern physics. Thus, like the concept of the atom, the validity 
of the entelechy was to be evaluated against the background of contemporary biology, and 
to be assessed in terms of its ability to explain biological phenomena. 
This was exactly the attitude of logical empiricists. They never rejected Driesch’s 
vitalism on the grounds that it was a metaphysical heresy, and they agreed with Driesch that 
the concept should be judged on scientific grounds alone. Consequently, the logical 
empiricist rejection of vitalism is based on subtler concerns.9 
 
The Logical Empiricist Critique of Vitalism 
 
It is a historical fact that logical empiricists criticized Driesch’s doctrine of the entelechy and 
various other theories of vitalism. According to the previous interpretation, the criticisms of 
vitalism from logical empiricists were not, however, based on a commitment to metaphysical 
materialism. For logical empiricists, Driesch was not a metaphysician advancing heretical 
doctrines. Carnap later in his life praised Driesch and commented that “he was quite different 
from most philosophers in Germany in that he really wanted to develop a scientific 
philosophy” (Carnap 1966, 14).  
The most systematic critique of Driesch’s neo-vitalism within the logical empiricist 
context was developed by Frank. But overall Frank understood well that Driesch’s vitalism 
was based on empirical arguments. He claimed: “The introduction of the magnitude E, in 
accord with Driesch, certainly means going beyond the frame of physical laws, but in no way 
an abandonment of the ground of empirical science, nor an introduction of anthropomorphic, 
soul-like elements” (Frank 1998, 111). In this claim, Frank correctly pointed out that Driesch’s 
introduction of the entelechy (the vital factor E), resulted from his concerns over the 
difficulties of mechanistic explanations in embryology. Indeed, Driesch began his biologist 
career as a disciple of the school of developmental mechanics exemplified by Wilhelm Roux. 
Roux’s research program endorsed mechanistic explanations and remained suspicious of 
vitalistic doctrines. Yet in 1891, Driesch succeeded in separating the first two blastomeres of 
sea urchin eggs and showed that each half was capable of developing into an adult organism. 
Driesch’s experimental results contradicted those of Roux, who had advanced the mosaic 
theory of development suggesting that each half of the blastomere represented a 
determinate part of the adult organism. Greatly puzzled by these results, Driesch later 
concluded that a few embryological phenomena could not be fully explained in mechanistic 
concepts (Churchill 1969; Allen 2008). 
In 1907, Driesch was invited to give the Gifford Lectures in Aberdeen, Scotland. Based 
 
9 The biologist C.H. Waddington shared this concern. Facing another distinguished biologist Francis 
Crick’s attack on vitalism (Crick 1966, 99), he questioned: “is a quark included? And if biologists should 
find it necessary to postulate an entity as odd as a quark, would that be vitalistic or not?” (Waddington 
1967, 203). 




on these lectures he published Science and Philosophy of the Organism (1929), a 
comprehensive illustration of his doctrine of vitalism. In Driesch’s deepened proofs for 
vitalism, he contended that mechanistic explanations failed to adequately deal with the 
complexity of embryological processes. For Driesch, the morphogenetic system was a 
harmonious-equipotential unit and a number of developmental phenomena were 
unintelligible if biologists only took mechanical variables (the sizes of the embryo, internal 
and external conditions, formative and directive stimuli, chemical compounds, etc.) into 
consideration. Disappointed at mechanistic explanations, Driesch concluded that a vital 
factor E, namely, entelechy, must be responsible for the generation of these peculiar 
phenomena.  
For logical empiricists, Driesch was correct, and it was a truism, that mechanistic 
explanations were largely unavailable in most areas of biology. Though it was certainly 
necessary to further pursue such explanations, Frank detected a danger that materialism and 
mechanism in some cases were degenerating into empty words. For this he even felt the 
need to issue a limited defense of vitalism:  
 
To be sure, Driesch shows that we can assume for the living processes a specific state 
variable, not that we must. For it is not possible to foresee every trick that one might 
invent in the fiction of hidden combinations of inorganic state variables. In favor of 
vitalism, I should like to remark that, just as I cannot force someone who regards heat 
as a specific state variable to consider it as a motion of particles, so I cannot force the 
adherents of entelechy to replace it by fictitious state variables. (Frank 1941, 26-27) 
 
For Frank, the introduction of fictitious inorganic state variables was not acceptable.  Indeed, 
it was just these similar concerns that pushed Frank to reject vitalism.  
Frank developed thorough criticisms of Driesch’s doctrine of the entelechy in his 1932 
Das Kausalgesetz und seine Grenzen (Frank 1998, 95-136; also see Frank 1970). In this book, 
after raising criticisms of various details, Frank concluded that Driesch failed to justify his 
conclusion. To start, despite his early sympathy with Driesch’s approach, Frank argued that 
the introduction of the entelechy was far from necessary. For Frank, although numerous 
phenomena in biology remained unexplained in terms of some contemporary physico-
chemical theories, Driesch in his reasoning had not considered every possibility; moreover, 
Driesch also failed to show that for these biological phenomena mechanistic explanations 
would always remain unavailable in future.  
After that Frank contributed a more general critique of vitalism and its related 
concepts, which in my view better reflected the ethos of logical empiricism. Importantly, 
Frank saw no essential difference between biological explanations through finalism, purpose, 
plan, and entelechy, and they were rejected for exactly the same reason. The essential defect 
of these explanations was never related to any metaphysical commitments, but to their poor 
scientific merits. For instance, Frank claimed that “the mere assumption of the ‘existence of 
a plan’ is meaningless” (Frank 1998, 98), and “in the case of living organisms (…) the mere 
claim of ‘aiming at a purpose’ is meaningless” (Frank 1998, 102). In brief, the introduction of 
concepts like purpose, plan and entelechy, “does not help us toward any deeper 
understanding” (Frank 1998, 97).  
If these concepts were to have any real scientific merits, according to Frank, biologists 
must give laws that indicated determinate consequences associated with these concepts. 
For instance, Driesch must further explicate the concept of the entelechy, through 
identifying “a detailed rule from which it could be deduced how much can be taken away 
from an ovum in the process of cell division without destroying the growth of a whole 
organism” (Frank 1998, 98). Further, “a general connection between the stages of division 
and the possibility of a regeneration of the whole” must be found (Frank 1998, 98). For 
vitalists who assumed “the existence of a plan”, Frank wrote, “if somebody could clearly 




explain the plan that nature pursues with respect to the evolution of organisms, the claim 
that the history of evolution is purposeful would be of a scientific character; for then the 
future could be predicted from it” (Frank 1998, 99). Unfortunately, “nobody can foresee 
future development from the hypothesis of compliance with a plan, since nobody knows the 
plan” (Frank 1998, 99). 
The conceptual defect was better shown through a comparison between finalism (the 
use of “purpose”) in physics and biology. Frank suggested that in some sense physics also 
used finalist explanations: 
 
For example if we say about heavy bodies only that they strive towards the center of 
the earth, or that nature pursues a purpose of assembling all heavy bodies at the center 
of the earth, that there is a tendency to produce an arrangement in which all heavy 
bodies group themselves around the center as a big ball and it happens that bodies are 
stopped in their path only by external causes, then with all this we say something about 
the processes of motion of heavy bodies that is not directly incorrect.  (Frank 1998, 98) 
 
Why was the finalist language accepted by physics? This was because, according to Frank, 
physicists were able to answer the following questions: “Under what circumstances a heavy 
body is stopped on its way to the center, how such an obstacle can deflect it, and how its 
motion takes place in detail. However, such rules of balance and the motion of bodies can be 
found in the science of mechanics” (Frank 1998, 98). For Frank, physics did not reject finalist 
language, but the superiority of finalism in physics over that in biology lied in its much 
stronger explanatory power. This was achieved through the formulations of physical laws 
such as the laws of gravitation. As Frank pointed out, “we need only glance at the history of 
physics and chemistry to see that progress always goes hand in hand with the replacement 
of teleological, anthropomorphic notions by mathematical laws” (Frank 1998, 84). Indeed, 
finalism in physics had long been purged of its anthropomorphic-animistic meaning, while 
finalism in biology by and large retained it. To put it more explicitly, the end, the plan, and the 
purpose of the heavy bodies striving towards the center of the earth were accurately known 
to physicists through laws in physics, but the end, the plan, and the purpose of the 
embryological development was only asserted, but never really articulated by vitalistic 
biologists.  
Frank compared biology with not only physics but also with theology. Surprising to 
many philosophers and scientists today, Frank did not dismiss as nonsense the hypothesis 
that some natural phenomena were created through God’s miraculous power, and 
sometimes he even ironically suggested that its formulation as superior to that of biological 
vitalism (Frank 1998, 94). But for Frank, the use of miracles in explanation could make sense 
only if one could demonstrate how God carried out the miracles. One must give laws 
governing the production of miracles and thus illuminated how God did His work. Further, as 
Frank consistently maintained, one could not negatively justify the use of miracle or the 
entelechy by appealing to the gaps left by mechanistic explanations (as Driesch and many 
theologians had done). Instead, these concepts were only justifiable by giving positive law 
statements (Frank 1998, 82). 
Through the comparisons above, the defects of biological vitalism and Driesch’s 
entelechy should be fully exposed. The entelechy failed to have its own laws giving 
determinate and testable results. A similar line of argument was developed by two other 
logical empiricists, Carl Hempel and Carnap. In Hempel’s case, he agreed with Frank that 
Driesch was not advancing any mysterious metaphysics. Driesch’s theory of vitalism should 
be rejected, not because it assumed the existence of mysterious agents. The concept of the 
field in physics was equally unavailable to sense experience (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948). 
However, the crucial difference was that the concept of the field was associated with general 
laws governing its effects on physical bodies and was, therefore, able to generate testable 




hypotheses. In contrast, the concept of the entelechy in biology could do neither, and the 
entelechy was simply “inaccessible to empirical test and thus devoid of empirical meaning” 
(Hempel and Oppenheim 1948, 330). 
Carnap once conducted a debate with Driesch. Driesch justified his use of the entelechy 
by claiming that physicists employed the concept of magnetism. Nonetheless, Carnap quickly 
pointed out that Driesch’s entelechy seemed to “lack something” (Carnap 1966, 14). As 
Carnap emphasized, the crucial difference was that physicists after introducing magnetism 
had further offered laws of magnetism. The laws might be formulated in quantitative terms, 
like “Maxwell equations that describe magnetic fields” (Carnap 1966, 15). The laws also could 
remain at the qualitative level, and “if you magnetize a needle and suspend it by the middle 
so that it swings freely, one end will point north” (Carnap 1966, 15). By contrast, the entelechy 
did not constitute any natural laws and thus failed to offer any determinate and testable 
empirical consequences. 
In sum, Frank, Hempel and Carnap reached a logical empiricist consensus consisting of 
two claims concerning vitalism. The first is that Driesch’s vitalism was not guilty of any 
heretical metaphysical claims. The second is that the concept of the entelechy had few 
scientific merits, since it failed to give precise vital laws explaining biological phenomena and 
therefore had no clear empirical reference. 
 
The Physicalism of Logical Empiricists 
 
“Physicalism” is a term popularized by logical empiricists in the 1930s. Now sometimes 
branded as an updated form of materialism, physicalism in philosophy of biology offers the 
new ground for rejecting vitalism. For some philosophers (Godfrey-Smith 2014, 10; Brigandt 
and Love 2017), physicalism and vitalism contradict each other and only one choice is possible. 
However, as I have shown above, logical empiricists would not endorse such a refutation of 
vitalism conducted at the metaphysical level. The physicalism of logical empiricists, as a 
matter of fact, had a meaning different from that understood in the current philosophy of 
biology. In the following, I show that the physicalism of logical empiricists was only a working 
hypothesis, and this hypothesis could not by itself exclude other hypotheses about vitalism.10 
Indeed, the physicalism of logical empiricists was close in spirit to a posterior physicalism, a 
position that has become increasingly popular in recent years (Banks 2014). 
The physicalism understood in the philosophy of biology today still ensures a 
metaphysical rejection of vitalism. By sharp contrast, the physicalism of logical empiricists 
was hypothetical and empirical in character, although sometimes blurred by too polemic 
tones. For instance, first, Hempel explicitly claimed that the physicalism of logical empiricism 
was only a working maxim, and it remained detached from traditional materialist 
metaphysics. For Hempel, “the reducibility of the laws of the non-physical sciences to those 
of physics is an open question…the issue cannot be settled on a priori grounds or with 
philosophical methods alone; it calls for further scientific research” (Hempel 1951, 321). 
Physicalism was proposed as a “heuristic maxim” for scientific research (Hempel 1951, 321). 
Clearly, in Hempel’s eyes, physicalism only suggested a research direction in close 
relationship with empirical sciences, and it was devoid of metaphysical meanings (also see 
Hempel 1969). 
Second, the physicalism of logical empiricists was also empirical in character. This in 
general means that unlike physicalists defending physicalism as a set of metaphysical truths, 
logical empiricists were clear about the limitation of their physicalist project. They never 
claimed that physics had already unified other non-physical sciences. For example, Feigl in his 
 
10  Logical empiricists would not be surprised that their physicalism is misunderstood today. For 
instance, Feigl noted that “it was easy again for metaphysically-minded opponents to misconstrue this 
position [physicalism] as a variant of ontological materialism” (Feigl 1981a, 289). 




treatise on physicalism and the unity of science claimed that physicalism was “by no means 
as sufficiently established by the progress of research to date” (Feigl 1981b, 302). Even 
Carnap’s more passionate the Unity of Science admitted that “biological research in its 
present form is not adequate to answer the question” whether “the natural laws which 
suffice to explain all inorganic phenomena can also be a sufficient explanation in the region 
of the organic” (Carnap 1934, 68), and it could only be answered “in the course of the future 
development of empirical research” (Carnap 1934, 68). 
Yet admittedly, it is also true that some logical empiricists often indicated a strong 
dogmatic tendency, which blurred the hypothetical and empirical character of their 
physicalist project. For instance, in some rather polemic essays for physicalism, Otto Neurath 
did not show any interest in logical analysis, instead, he was more inclined to condemn non-
materialistic concepts, from Driesch’s entelechy to Hegel’s Spirit, as meaningless 
metaphysics. For instance, against vitalism, Neurath wrote, “In the field of biology, the 
physicalists reject ‘vitalism’ insofar as it maintains that non space-time entities become 
‘effective.’” (Neurath 1931, 621). Unlike Frank, Hempel and Carnap, Neurath never gave a 
close analysis of the concept of the entelechy. But even so, overall Neurath was still clear of 
the empirical nature of his project. Though today Neurath’s physicalism is branded as 
“empiricism without empirical research” (Cat 2014), like other logical empiricists he 
emphasized that his physicalism went “without metaphysics” (Neurath 1983, 58), and it was 
a task to be accomplished. 
On how to be a genuine empiricist Nagel might be a good example. Nagel not only 
pointed out the contemporary limitation of physicalism but even remained suspicious of its 
future. In his philosophical reflections about biology, Nagel understood the scientific 
situation as that “it is no less evident that the techniques of observation and experimentation 
in biology are in general different from those current in the physical sciences” (Nagel 1979, 
399-400). Evidence also shows that Nagel was suspicious of the possibility of reducing 
biology to physics in the future, even though he did not deny this possibility. For Nagel, “the 
task facing such a proposed reduction is admittedly a most difficult one; and it undoubtedly 
impresses many students as one which, if not utterly hopeless, is at present not worth 
pursuing” (Nagel 1979, 435). More importantly, Nagel developed an open mind toward 
alternative approaches. Commenting perhaps on the philosopher of biology Joseph 
Woodger’s anti-physicalist approach to clarifying concepts and laws in biology, Nagel wrote, 
“(…) there is a genuine alternative in biology to both vitalism and mechanism-namely, the 
development of systems of explanation that employ concepts and assert relations neither 
defined in nor derived from the physical sciences” (Nagel 1979, 431). 
Finally, the physicalism of logical empiricists could be better understood by referring 
again to the concept of the atom. Recall Hull’s claim, “Organisms are ‘nothing but’ 
atoms…and that is that” (Hull 1981, 282). In contrast, Frank depicted the contemporary 
status of biological research as follows: “The exact physical observation of the atoms of a 
living body is [still] compatible with the known empirical laws for the behavior of living bodies 
and with the physical hypothesis about their atomic structures” (Frank 1949b, 169-70). Frank 
avoided being dogmatic. He acknowledged that once empirical evidence demonstrating the 
incompatibility between the vital laws of a living body and the physical laws of its atomic 
structures had been submitted, it would be scientific to claim that the living body had vital 
laws of its own.11 As Frank summarized, the possibility of such “a vitalist presentation of 
natural phenomena…should not be denied” (Frank 1998, 117). 
 
 
11  In Feigl’s words, “[Alfred] Whitehead’s suggestion that the behavior of electrons within living 
organisms may be fundamentally different from that in inorganic compounds can of course not be 
refuted a priori” (Feigl 1981b, 317). 







Logical empiricists rejected the concept of the entelechy because vital laws were not 
available in biology. For logical empiricists, moreover, it was meaningless to reject vitalism by 
presupposing materialist metaphysics, and the possibility of future vital laws could not be 
denied, at least in principle. On the contrary, they accepted the concept of the atom, because 
it could be associated with physical laws and verifiable experimental results. But logical 
empiricists declined to view the validity of the concept of the atom as supporting 
metaphysical materialism (or physicalism). 
Further, I believe that an adequate understanding of the logical empiricist criticism of 
vitalism has deeper implications for the contemporary philosophy of biology. Consider, for 
instance, organicism, which claims to offer a promising middle road between (reductive) 
materialism and vitalism (Gilbert and Sarkar 2000). Yet if we accept the logical empiricist 
criticism of vitalism, organicism turns out to be dubious as well. First, the judgment that 
organicism as material holism is superior to vitalism loses its ground because it is no longer 
legitimate to refute vitalism by presupposing materialist metaphysics. Second, organicism in 
its current form stresses the importance of treating biological organisms as holistic 
organizations, but this is nothing more than a truism. This organicist concern equally applies 
to complex physico-chemical organizations, and in present biology, there is no contradiction 
in treating biological organisms as merely complex physico-chemical organizations. As a 
result, unlike vitalism which has advanced the entelechy as a bio-specific concept, current 
organicism fails to capture the genuine specificity of biological organisms. Third, if follows 
that, in order to be bio-specific, organicism must be able to show how biological organization 
is different from the merely complex physico-chemical organization. One way here is to offer 
laws specific to biological organization (x is a biological organization if and only if these laws 
apply to x). Yet if these laws were available, it would then be difficult to distinguish them 
from vital laws vitalists are supposed to provide. 
Even more interestingly, the rationale of the logical empiricist criticism of vitalism also 
applies to some concepts popular in reductive materialism as to concepts like genetic 
program and genetic information, it is often the case that biologists use them as if 
physiological, developmental and even evolutionary mechanisms have already been laid out 
in the physical structures of genes. Admittedly, these concepts appear to have certain 
material bases in genes and are thus materialism-friendly. However, a logical empiricist 
evaluation of these concepts cares little about whether they are materialism-friendly or not. 
Regarding concepts like program and information, further, the result of such an evaluation 
is not optimal. As Frank already alluded above – in the comparison between “fictitious 
[inorganic] state variable” and the entelechy, (Frank 1941, 26-7; also see Mainx 1970, 629) –, 
these concepts are currently just as defective as the entelechy, if they are used as causative 
agents which only nominally “unify” various biological mechanisms. These concepts are 
defective, since, unfortunately, in most cases, the determinate relations between these 
concepts and respective mechanisms are merely asserted, rather than precisely established 
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